MCDR- CA
PKI Certificate Policy

1 Document History

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02	24/08/2005	Modification of Section 4.8 and 4.9.1 and correction of grammatical mistakes	C. REMAN
03	26/08/2005	Modification of Section 6, 9.6.2 and 9.12 and other section to remove information about operators and LRA keys	C. REMAN
04	05/09/2005	Modification following remarks	C. REMAN
05	19/09/2006	Modification with MCDR Team	F. CAVENNE
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09	27/10/2010	Modifications according to ITIDA requirements	Amr Radwan
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MCDR Public

Any hard copy versions are for REFERENCE ONLY

MCDR Public

Any hard copy versions are for REFERENCE ONLY

References

TITLE	REFERENCE
FIPS 140-2 - Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules	[FIPS 140-2]
ISO/IEC 3166 – Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions – Part 1 : country codes	[ISO3166]
ISO/IEC 7816 - Identification Cards - Integrated Circuit Cards with Contacts	[ISO7816]
ISO/IEC 17799 – Information technology - Security techniques Information security management systems Requirements 11/2013	[ISO/IEC 27001]
ISO/IEC 9594-8 (2001) - Information Technology – Open Systems Interconnection: The Directory : Authentication Framework.	[ISO9594-8]
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) - Network Working Group	[RFC5280]
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework (November 2003) - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) - Network Working Group	[RFC3647]
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Qualified Certificates Profile (March 2004) - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) - Network Working Group	[RFC3739]
ETSI TS 101 456 V1.2.1 – Policy requirements for certification authorities issuing qualified certificates, February 2004.	[ETSI TS 101 456]
ISO/IEC 27002 Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for information security controls 10/2013	[ISO/IEC 27002]
Law n°15 Of The Year 2004 Regulating Electronic Signature (E-Signature) and Establishing The Information Technology (IT) Industry Development Authority	[L-15]
Ministry Of Communications And Information Technology – Decree n°101 For The Year 2010 Dated 30/8/2010 Issuing The Executive Regulations Of The Electronic Signature Law And Establishing The Information Technology (IT) Industry Development Authority	[D-109]

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3 Introduction

MISR for Central Clearing , Depository and Registry (MCDR) is a private, non -profit joint stock company aiming at providing public services for all concerned parties in the Capital Market including brokerage firms, custodian banks, issuers, investors and other financial firms

MCDR is developing a security system to provide strong cryptographic protection for Egyptian citizens but mainly for stock market Investors and Brokers when a share trading deal is carried out in Egypt. The aim of such a system is to stimulate investments in Egyptian Stock Exchanges through simplifying issuing securities procedures, trading and settling transactions, and facilitates the execution of equity swap operations, merges and acquisitions.

Part of this security system is a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), consisting of products and services, which provide and manage X.509 certificates for public key cryptography. These services will be used for signature and authentication in the context described above but also for other types of transactions involving other third parties.

PKI provides the elements needed for a trusted environment and services that enable digital signatures, strong authentication, data integrity, non-repudiation, and confidentiality. Digital certificates identify the individual named in the certificate, and bind that person to a particular public/private key pair.

A Certificate Policy (CP) is a named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements.

4 Overview

This document defines the Certificate Policy (CP) for the issuance of MCDR Digital Signature Certificates by the MCDR Certification Authority.

The MCDR Digital Signature Certificate is for the management and use of certificates containing public keys used for authentication and data integrity and in support of non-repudiation.

The MCDR Certification Authority is a direct subordinate CA to the ITIDA Root Certificate Authority. This CP complies with the regulations and license requirements issued by ITIDA.

The information contained in this Certificate Policy is intended for personnel charged with the management and operation of certificates issued by the MCDR Certification Authority as well as for Subjects, Subscribers and other Relying Parties which have a relationship with MCDR Certificate Authority in respect to certificates issued by this CA.

This CP complies with the formal requirements of IETF RFC 3647 - Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework – with regard to format and content.

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4.1   Document Name and Identification

This document is named: .

4.2   PKI Participants

The following sections introduce the PKI and community roles involved in issuing certificates and managing the certificate life cycle process.

4.2.1   Policy Management Authority (PMA)

The MCDR Policy Management Authority (PMA) is a body established by MCDR to:

- Oversee the creation and update of certificate policies, including evaluation of changes requested and plans for implementing any accepted changes.

- Review the Certification Practice Statements (CPS) to ensure that the practices of PKI components comply with the associated Certificate Policy.

- Oversee and audit the PKI.

The Policy Management Authority is

1- MCDR Chairman

2- MCDR Managing director

3- MCDR ISMS Manager

4- MCDR Internal Audit Manager

4.2.2   Certification Authority (CA)

The Certification Authority (CA) is the entity authorized by the PMA to create, sign and issue certificates.

The CA is responsible for all aspects of the issuance and management of a certificate.

The CA shall ensure that the following functions are performed in accordance with the stipulations of this Policy:

- Certificate generation and revocation.

- Certificate Revocation List (CRL) publication.

CA functions shall be performed by trained and vetted personnel knowing and applying procedures described in the CP and CPS.

MCDR CA is certified by the ITIDA. (Egypt Root Certificate) allowing Relying Parties to have a trusted certification path for certificate interoperability.

The certificate registration function is a mandatory function of a PKI. The registration function is carried out by a component of the PKI separate from the CA which is bound to the CA or works with the CA.

The CA shall process and validate certification requests and revocation requests coming from Registration Authorities (RA).

4.2.3 Registration Authority (RA)

The Registration Authority is the entity that enters into an Agreement with the CA to collect and verify certificate applicants' identity and information, which is to be entered into certificates.

The RA ensures that the following functions are performed in accordance with the stipulations of this Policy :

- Coordinate certification requests.

- Verify the applicant's identity and information and applicant's right for performing such a request.

- Collect and process revocation and unlock requests through the CA.

RA functions are performed by trained and vetted personnel knowing and applying procedures described in the CP and CPS.

The RA could consist of one or several separate entities(VO, IRO.SCO). Several structures could be allowed as long as the registration process is in accordance with the stipulations of this Policy. So, the RA may delegate all or a part of its functions to local entities (LRA). In that case, the RA shall be responsible for LRAs and shall supervise them.

4.2.4 Local Registration Authority (LRA)

A Local Registration Authority (LRA) is the entity that performs registration tasks on behalf of the RA.

A LRA is supervised by the RA. It may have a geographical or business connotation and it operates within the framework of the MCDR PKI accredited procedures.

LRA ensures that the following functions are performed in accordance with the stipulations of this Policy:

- Verify the Subscriber/Subject's identity, register it and register the Trusted Signatories within the Subscriber organisation.

- Verify the applicant's identity and/or information and applicant's right for performing such a request.

- Manage and protect private data relating to Subscribers and Subjects.

- Deliver to the Subject the smartcard or token containing the public/private key pair and the associated certificate and smartcard's or token's PIN and revocation code.

- Collect and process revocation and unlock requests.

LRA functions are performed by trained and vetted personnel knowing and applying procedures described in the CP and CPS.

4.2.5 Subscribers

A Subscriber is the entity that contracts with the MCDR Certification Authority for the issuance of certificates on behalf of one or more Subjects.

The Subscriber have to authenticate its subject information according to the face to face registration process, all of subscribers stipulations are mentioned in the subscriber agreement referenced MCDR- CO-عقد تقديم خدمات التوقيع الإلكترونى -02

All certificates are issued to individuals for their own use.. In other cases, such as certificates issued to employees, the Subscriber and Subject are different. The Subscriber would be, for instance, the employer and the Subject would be the employee.

Subscribers of MCDR include (I.E):

- Issuer companies,

- Brokerage firms / custodians,

- Individual investors,

- Financial Regulatory Authority FRA

- Egyptian Stock Exchange EGX,

- Clearing banks,

- Banks,

- Financial Institutions

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4.2.6 Subjects

A Subject is the entity whose name appears as the Subject in a certificate and who asserts that it uses its key and certificate in accordance with this Policy.

Subjects are individual persons that:

- Apply for a certificate.

- Are identified in a certificate.

- Hold the private key corresponding to the public key that is listed in a Subject certificate.

4.2.7 Relying Parties

A Relying Party is an entity including individuals and/or companies that rely on a certificate and/or a digital signature verifiable with reference to a public key listed in a Subject's certificate.

A Relying Party may, or may not also be a Subject or a Subscriber within the PKI.

The Relying Parties shall have access to directory services to obtain PKI related information such as the CRLs.

They shall also have access to a Web site to obtain related information such as this Policy.

4.2.8 Other participants

No stipulations.

4.3 Certificate Usage

Certificates asserting a policy OID defined in this document shall only be used for transactions described in this Policy.

4.3.1 Appropriate Certificate Uses

MCDR certificates shall be used for the following purposes:

- Digital signature of documents or data according to the Egyptian Law n°15 of 2004 and the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology Decree n°101 of 2010.

4.3.2 Prohibited Certificate Uses

CA certificates may not be used for any other functions except CA functions. Moreover, Subject certificates shall not be used as CA certificates.

4.4 Policy Administration

4.4.1 Organization Administering the Document

The PMA is responsible for the definition, revision and promulgation of this Policy.

The Policy Management Authority consists of :

- MCDR's chairman

- MCDR's managing director

- ISMS Manager

- Internal Audit Manager

4.4.2 Contact Person

For issues related to this CP, please contact:

MCDR Policy Management Authority

70 El-Gomhoria Street

Cairo

EGYPT

Phone: +2022 5971 666

Website: www.mcsd.com.eg

4.4.3 Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy

The PMA determines the suitability of any CPS to this Policy.

4.4.4 CPS Approval Procedures

ISMS Department shall submit the CPS to the PMA for compliance analysis with this CP at the given level of assurance. The PMA shall commission a compliance analysis study culminating into a written report that provides a summary of areas in which the CPS may not or does not comply

with this CP. The PMA shall resolve these discrepancies prior to approving the CPS. The CA must have a PMA approved CPS and meet all CP/CPS requirements prior to commencing operations.

4.5 Definitions and Acronyms

4.5.1 Definitions

Activation data	Data values, other than keys, that are required to operate cryptographic modules and that need to be protected (e.g., a PIN, a passphrase, or a manually-held key share).
Applicant	The Subject is sometimes also called an "applicant" after applying to a Certificate Authority for a certificate, but before the certificate issuance procedure is completed.
Archive	Collection of compressed historical documents, records or backups.
Audit	Independent review and examination of records and activities to assess the adequacy of system controls, to ensure compliance with established policies and operational procedures, and to recommend necessary changes in controls, policies, or procedures.
Backup	Copy of files and programs made to facilitate recovery if necessary.
Certificate Authority (CA)	An authority trusted by one or more users to issue and manage X.509 public key certificates and CRLs.
Certificate	A digital representation of information which at least identifies the certification authority issuing it, names or identifies its Subject, contains the Subject's public key, identifies its operational period, and is digitally signed by the Certification Authority issuing it.
Certificate Policy (CP)	A Certificate Policy is a specialized form of administrative policy tuned to electronic transactions performed during certificate management. A CP addresses all aspects associated with the generation, production, distribution, accounting, compromise recovery and administration of digital certificates.
Certificate Revocation List (CRL)	A list maintained and published by CA for its revoked certificates.
Certification Practice Statement (CPS)	A statement of the practices that a CA employs in issuing, , revoking and renewing certificates and providing access to them, in accordance with specific requirements (i.e., requirements specified in this CP, or requirements specified in a contract for services).

Certification path	A path starts with the subject certificate and proceeds through number of intermediate certificates up to the trusted root certificates typically issued by trusted CA
Common Name	This is the X.500 common Name attribute, which contains a name of an object. If the object corresponds to a person, it is typically the person's full name.
Cryptographic module	The set of hardware, software, firmware, or some combination thereof that implements cryptographic logic or processes, including cryptographic algorithms, and is contained within the cryptographic boundary of the module.
Digital signature	The result of a transformation of a message by means of a cryptographic system using keys such that a Relying Party who has the initial message can determine :
	(a)Whether the transformation was created using the key that corresponds to the signer's key; and
	(b)Whether the message has been altered since the transformation was made.
Distinguished Name (DN)	An ISO X.501 term defining a standard for unique identifiers for people, devices or other objects
Entity	Any autonomous element within the PKI. This may be a CA, a RA, an LRA or a Subject.
Key pair	Two mathematically related keys having the properties that one key can be used to encrypt a message that can only be decrypted using the other key, and even knowing one key, it is computationally infeasible to discover the other key.
Local Registration Authority (LRA)	A Registration Authority with responsibility for a local community.
Object Identifier (OID)	A specialized formatted number that is registered with an internationally recognized standards organization. The unique alphanumeric/numeric identifier registered under the ISO registration standard to reference a specific object or object class.
PKI	PKI is a set of policies, processes, server platforms, software, and workstations used to administer certificates and public-private key pairs, including the ability to issue, maintain, and revoke public key certificates.

Policy Management Authority (PMA)	Body established to oversee the creation and update of Certificate Policies, review Certification Practice Statements, review the results of CA audits for policy compliance, evaluate non-domain policies for acceptance within the domain, and generally oversee and manage the PKI certificate policies.
Private key	The signing key used to create a digital signature or the key of an encryption key pair that is used to decrypt confidential information. In both cases, this key must be kept secret.
Public key	The signing key used to validate a digital signature or the key of an encryption key pair that is used to encrypt confidential information. In both cases, this key is made publicly available normally in the form of a digital certificate.
Registration Authority (RA)	An entity that is responsible for one or more of the following functions: identification and authentication of certificate applicants, the approval or rejection of certificate applications, initiating certificate revocations under certain circumstances, processing Subject requests to revoke their certificates, and approving or rejecting requests by Subjects to renew or re-key their certificates. RAs, however, do not sign or issue certificates (i.e., an RA is delegated certain tasks on behalf of a CA).
Re-key (a certificate)	To change the value of a cryptographic key that is being used in a cryptographic system application.
Relying Party	A recipient of a certificate who acts in reliance on that certificate and/or any digital signatures verified using that certificate.
Relying Party Agreement	An Agreement used by a CA or RA setting forth the terms and conditions under which an individual or organization acts as a Relying Party.
Renew (a certificate)	The act or process of extending the validity of the data binding asserted by a public key certificate by issuing a new certificate.
Repository	A trustworthy system for storing and retrieving certificates or other information relevant to certificates. It may also be referred to as a directory.
Revoke (a certificate)	To prematurely end the operational period of a certificate effective at a specific date and time.
Root Certificate Authority (root CA)	In a hierarchical PKI, the CA whose public key serves as the most trusted datum (i.e., the beginning of trust certification paths) for a security domain.
Smartcard	A hardware token that contains a chip to implement among others cryptographic functions and that possesses some inherent resistance to tampering.

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Subject	A Subject is an entity that is the subject named or identified in a certificate issued to that entity; holds a private key that corresponds to the public key listed in the certificate, and does not itself issue certificates to another party. A Subject may be a Subscriber acting on its own behalf.
Subject Agreement	An Agreement used by a CA or RA setting forth the terms and conditions under which an individual or organization acts as a Subject.
Subscriber	A Subscriber is an entity subscribing with a CA on behalf of one or more Subjects.
Subscriber Agreement	An Agreement used by a CA or RA setting forth the terms and conditions under which an individual or organization acts as a Subscriber.
Trusted Signatory	An employee of an organization nominated within the Subscriber Agreement who can authorize an employee of its organization to apply for a certificate.
Update (a certificate)	The act or process by which data items bound in an existing public key certificate, especially authorizations granted to the subject, are changed by issuing a new certificate.

4.5.2 Acronyms

CA	Certification Authority
EGX	Egyptian Stock Exchanges
FRA	Financial Regulatory Authority
CN	Common Name
CP	Certificate Policy
CPS	Certification Practice Statement
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
DN	Distinguish Name
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
ISO	International Organization for standards
LRA	Local Registration Authority
MCDR	Misr for Central Clearing, Depository and Registry
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID	Object Identifier
PIN	Personal Identification Number
PKCS	Public Key Cryptographic Statndard
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PKIX	Public Key Infrastructure X.509
PMA	Policy Management Authority
RA	Registration Authority
RFC	Request For Comment
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (encryption algorithm)
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm

4.5.3 URL 4.5.4 Uniform Resource Locator

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5 Publication and Repository Responsibilities

5.1 Repositories

The CA shall publish information in an online repository. The repository should be available twenty-four (24) hours per day, seven (7) days per week subject to the maximum period of unavailability as specified in the CPS.

5.2 Publication of Certification Information

All current documentation regarding the CA is published on MCDR web site at the following URL : **www.mcsd.com.eg** due to their sensitivity whole or part of the CPS, including certain security controls, procedures related to the management of the CA shall not be published.

However, the PMA can decide to provide the full CPS document to an authorized organization for auditing purpose for instance and under appropriate confidentiality agreement.

The CA shall provide an online repository that is available to Subscribers, Subjects and Relying Parties and that contains:

- The CA certificate.

- The ITIDA Root CA certificate to which the CA is subordinated.

- The most recent CRL.

- This Policy.

- Subscriber Agreements.

- Subject Agreements.

- Relying Party Agreements.

Details about the way to access those information shall be specified in the CPS.

5.3 Time or Frequency of Publication

CA information shall be published promptly after it is made available to the CA.

The CRL is valid for(24 hours) and refreshed after (12 hours) which means that it will have the same expiry date of the first one also it is refreshed immediately whenever a certificate is revoked.

The CPS shall specify time limits within which it will publish various types of information.

The PMA ensures that all documentation that has been updated, is published as soon as they come into effect.

5.4 Access Controls on Repositories

Repository implements controls to prevent unauthorized persons from adding, deleting or modifying entries.

Repository services, CRL and published documents are available to the public as a read-only information.

6 Identification and Authentication

6.1 Naming

6.1.1 Type of Names

Names used in certificates shall have a clearly distinguishable and unique X.501 Distinguished Name (DN) in the certificate Issuer and Subject name fields and in accordance with PKIX.

The DN shall be in the form of a X.501.

6.1.2 Need for Names to be Meaningful

The contents of each certificate Subject and Issuer name fields must have an association with the authenticated name of the Entity.

The DN of a Subject shall include the following fields :

- Country (C).

- Organization (O).

- Common Name (CN).

- Serial Number (SERIALNUMBER).

The DN of Subject may also include the following optional fields :

- Title (TITLE).

- Organizational Unit (OU).

In the case of individuals, the CN shall be a combination of first name, middle name(s), surname, as required to ensure uniqueness.

The DN may also include an organizational position or role, a department unit or an internal identification number.

6.1.3 Anonymity or Pseudonym of Subjects

The CA shall not issue anonymous certificates. Certificates issued by the CA shall not contain anonymous or pseudonymous identities.

6.1.4 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

No stipulation.

6.1.5 Uniqueness of Names

The uniqueness of certificates is based on the uniqueness of certificate serial number within the CA. DN names shall be unique for all Subjects of the CA.

The CA shall ensure the uniqueness of names of its certificate holders defined in its naming policy. The CA shall investigate and correct if necessary any name collisions brought to its attention.

An applicant shall demonstrate its right to use a particular name.

6.1.6 Recognition, Authentication and Role of Trademarks

The CA is not required to issue a name that contains a registered trademark. The CA does not issue a certificate knowing that it includes a name that court has determined infringes the trademark of another. The CA is not obligated to research trademarks or resolve trademark disputes.

6.2 Initial Identity Validation

6.2.1 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

In all cases, the Subject shall prove to the CA possession of the private key, which corresponds to the public key submitted in the certificate request. This may be done by signing the request.

6.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity

The CA shall not issue certificates in the name of organizations, but only in the name of individuals who belong to organizations. Prior to issue of certificates in the name of individuals who belong to an organization, the CA or LRA shall register the organization through a face-to-face registration process with the organization Subscriber. The CA or LRA shall only accept Subscriber requests that contains the exhaustive list of required information. The CA or a LRA shall examine the documents in detail and verify if they seem valid and match the original documents.

The Subscriber organization shall provide the required information to identify himself, the organization and the Trusted Signatories of the organization. It shall also provide the Subscriber Agreement duly signed with a handwritten signature.

The identity of individuals shall be verified providing the information required in the Section 6.2.3.

The CA or LRA shall verify the information provided by the Subscriber.

The CA or LRA must keep a record of the type and details of identification used.

6.2.3 Authentication of Individual Identity

The authentication of individual is based on the personal (physical) presence of the certificate applicant before the LRA.

The LRA shall only accept requests that contains the exhaustive list of required information.

The LRA shall check the identity of the individual against a well-recognized form of government-issued photographic identification, such as a passport or a national identity card.

If the individual applies for a certificate as being an employee of an organization, the LRA shall authenticate the organization and the document from the organization authorizing the individual to apply as being an employee of the organization.

All individuals shall provide the Subject Agreement duly signed.

The CA or LRA shall verify the information provided by the individual.

The CA or LRA must keep a record of the type and details of identification used.

6.2.4 Non-Verified Subject Information

Non-verified Subject information includes:

- Organization Unit (OU).

- E-mail address.

- Any other information designated as non-verified in the certificate.

6.2.5 Validation of Authority

Certificates that contain explicit or implicit organization affiliations shall be issued only after ascertaining the Subject has the authorization to act on behalf of the organization in the implied capacity. Examples of these include CA, RA and LRA certificates.

6.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation

No stipulation.

6.3 Identification and Authentication for Renewal Requests

6.3.1 Identification and Authentication for Routine Renewal

renewal require the generation of a new public-private key pairs and generation of the corresponding new certificates.

The Subject shall periodically obtain new keys and re-establish its identity every three ((3)) years at maximum. Authentication for routine renewal requests shall be based on the same authentication process as for a new request in accordance with Section 6.2. Once the new key pair is generated and the new certificate is installed, the old key and certificate shall not be used other than for verification of historical data.

Any CA renewal request shall be initiated by the PMA.

6.4 Identification and Authentication for Revocation Requests

The CA or LRA acting on its behalf shall authenticate a request for revocation of a certificate.

The CA shall establish and make available the process by which it addresses such requests and the means by which it will establish the validity of the request.

Requests for revocation of certificates shall be processed immediately and logged.

Revocation requests must be authenticated as described in Section 7.9.3.

7   Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

7.1   Certificate Application

7.1.1   Who Can Submit a Certificate Application

Certificate application is submitted to the CA by a RA/LRA on behalf of the Subject.

7.1.2   Enrolment Process and Responsibilities

Certificate applicants have the responsibility to provide accurate information on their certificate applications.

The certificate applicant Subject is the individual submitting a certificate application.

Certificate application shall be on a written form signed by the Subject and the Subscriber's representative and shall include the following information:

- Full name and address.

- Date and place of birth.

- National identity number or a valid Passport number.

- Gender

- E-mail address of the Subject,

- Contact telephone number,

The following information may be optionally collected during the enrolment process:

- Unified Participant Code (if he is a stock market investor)

And, if the Subject acts on behalf of an organization, the certificate application shall include :

- Role or department of Subject within Subscriber organization.

- Signature of a Trusted Signatory nominated within the Subscriber Agreement.

Subjects undergo an enrolment process consisting of:

- Filling out an application form and providing true and correct information.

Then after having check information provided by the Subject, the RA/LRA continues the enrolment process with the following steps :

- Generating a certificate and the key pair.

- Delivering the generated public key corresponding to the private key to the CA.

- Demonstrating possession of the private key corresponding to the public key delivered to the CA.

7.2 Certificate Application Processing

7.2.1 Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

The RA or an LRA shall perform identification and authentication of all required information as described in Section 6.2.

7.2.2 Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

The certificate application may be rejected for various reasons such as inaccurate information. The CA, RA, LRA may reject a certificate application and should justify the rejection to the applicant or any other party.

A certificate application shall not be considered accepted until the CA has accepted the application and decided to issue a certificate.

7.2.3 Time to Process Certificate Applications

The CA, RA and LRA shall act on and process a certificate application within a time frame of five ((5)) working days from the receipt of a correctly completed application.

7.3 Certificate Issuance

7.3.1 CA Actions During Certificate Issuance

During the certificate issuance, the CA shall :

- Authenticate the certificate request and the RA which issued the request.

- Ensure that the public key is bound to the correct Subject and obtain proof of possession of the private key.

- Approve or disapprove the certificate request.

- Generate the certificate.

- Provide the certificate to the Subject through the RA/LRA.

7.3.2 Notifications to Subject by the CA of Issuance of Certificate

Not applicable.

7.4 Certificate Acceptance

7.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance

The Subject signature on a certificate acceptance form, on the Subject Agreement and Subscriber Agreement (if the Subject acts on its own behalf) shall constitute acceptance of the certificate.

The Subject signature shall be collected before the CA allows a Subject to make effective use of its private key.

7.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA

CA certificates and Subjects certificate may be published to the repository if there is a need for this.

7.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

A signed XML file will be sent to ITIDA via SSH connection from CSPBACKUP machine on weekly basis.

7.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage

7.5.1 Subject Private Key and Certificate Usage

Subscriber and Subject responsibilities for correct use of keys and certificates shall be clearly laid out in the Subscriber and Subject Agreements.

Subjects shall not use the signature key after the associated certificate has been revoked or has expired.

Subjects shall protect their private keys from unauthorized use and shall discontinue use of the private key following expiration or revocation of the certificate.

7.5.2 Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage

Relying Party responsibilities for correct use of public keys and certificates shall be clearly laid out in the Relying Party Agreements.

Relying Parties shall ensure that a public key in a certificate is used only for the purposes indicated by the key usage extension, if the extension is present.

7.6 Certificate Re-Key

Re-key a certificate means extend the certificate validity with the same name, key, and authorizations as the old one.

Certificate re-key is not allowed under this Policy.

7.6.1 Circumstances for Certificate Renewal

Not applicable.

7.6.2 Who May Request Re-key

Not applicable.

7.6.3 Processing Certificate Re–Key Requests

Not applicable.

7.6.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subject

Not applicable.

7.6.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Key Certificate

Not applicable.

7.6.6 Publication of the Re-Key Certificate by the CA

Not applicable.

7.6.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

Not applicable.

7.7 Certificate Renewal

Certificate renewal is the application for the issuance of a new certificate that certifies the new key pair (public key – Private Key).

7.7.1 Circumstances for Certificate

Prior to the expiration of an existing Subject's certificate, it is necessary for the subject to renew the certificate to maintain continuity of certificate usage.

7.7.2 Who May Request Certificate of a New Public Key

The Subject, CA, RA or LRA may request the renewal of a Subject certificate.

7.7.3 Processing Certificate Renewal Requests

The renewal process shall be akin to the initial certificate issuance process described in Section 7.3.

Renewal requires the generation of a new public-private key pairs and generation of the corresponding new certificates.

7.7.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subject

See Section 7.3.2.

7.7.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate

See Section 7.4.1.

7.7.6 Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA

See Section 7.4.2.

7.7.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

See Section 7.4.3.

7.8 Certificate Modification

Modifying (updating) a certificate means creating a new certificate that has a different key, a different serial number, from the old certificate.

Certificate modification is not allowed under this Policy. To modify any certificate information, the process to follow shall be the same as for a new certificate request.

7.8.1 Circumstances for Certificate Modification

Not applicable.

7.8.2 Who May Request Certificate Modification Requests

Not applicable.

7.8.3 Processing Certificate Modification Requests

Not applicable.

7.8.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subject

Not applicable.

7.8.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate

Not applicable.

7.8.6 Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA

Not applicable.

7.8.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

Not applicable.

7.9 Certificate Revocation

7.9.1 Circumstances for Revocation

Certificates shall be revoked:

- When any of the information in the certificate changes before the certificate expires.

- When there has been a loss, theft, modification, unauthorized disclosure or other compromise of the Subject's private key.

- When there has been a loss, theft, modification, unauthorized disclosure or other compromise of the media holding the Subject's private key.

- When the Subject is no longer an employee of the organization (for certificates issued to an organization Subscriber).

- When the Subject can be shown to have violated the stipulations of the Subscriber or Subject Agreement.

- When the Subscriber can be shown to have violated the stipulations of the Subscriber Agreement.

- When there has been a loss, theft, modification, unauthorized disclosure or other compromise of the CA's private key or more generally when the CA certificate is revoked.

Whenever any of the above circumstances occur, the associated certificate is revoked and placed on the CRL.

7.9.2 Who Can Request Revocation

The revocation shall be requested by:

- The Subject holding the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate.

- The Subscriber (or Subscriber Trusted Signatory) of the Subject certificate.

- Legal entities

7.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request

Any format (face-to-face Revocation Form or Telephone Revocation) that is used to request a revocation shall:

Identify the certificate to be revoked.

Explain the reason for revocation.

Allow the request to be authenticated (e.g. digitally or manually signed).

Following approval of the revocation request by the RA/LRA, the RA send a revocation request to the CA which shall authenticate and approve the request then automatically and immediately perform the revocation.

Authentication of certificate revocation requests is important to prevent malicious revocation of certificates by unauthorized parties. A record of the revocation request shall be maintained for audit purposes.

7.9.4 Revocation Request Grace Period

Revocation requests shall be processed and executed without delay upon receipt during the opening hours of the customer support help desk – Sunday to Thursday from 9:00 AM to 4:30 PM except on Egypt National Public Holidays.

The subscribers/subjects can perform their revocation requests through MCDR's CALL CENTER which is available twenty-four (24) hours per day seven (7) days per week.

7.9.5 Time Within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request

The CA shall process all revocation requests within one ((1)) hour of receipt and verification of a complete and verifiable revocation request during the opening time of the revocation service.

7.9.6 Revocation Checking Requirements for Relying Parties

Relying Parties shall check the status of certificates on which they wish to rely. They shall check all certificates in the certificate validation path against the current CRL. If it is temporarily infeasible to obtain revocation information, then the Relying Party shall either reject use of the

certificate, or make an informed decision to accept the risk, responsibility, and consequences for using a certificate whose authenticity cannot be guaranteed to the standards of this policy. Such use may occasionally be necessary to meet urgent operational requirements.

7.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency

The CA ensures that it issues and published to the repository and website.

The CRL is valid for(24 hours) and refreshed after (12 hours) which means that it will have the same expiry date of the first one also it is refreshed immediately whenever a certificate is revoked.

7.9.8 Maximum Latency for CRLs

The CRL is issued each (12 hour) where the first one is valid for (24 hours) and the second one is valid for (12 hours) which means that it will have the same expiry date of the first one and immediately whenever a certificate is revoked.

The CRL shall be posted upon generation, (but within no more than forty five ((45)) minutes after generation).

7.9.9 On-Line Revocation/Status Checking Availability

The CA does not currently support on-line revocation/status checking.

7.9.10 On-Line Revocation Checking Requirements

Not applicable.

7.9.11 Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available

No stipulation.

7.9.12 Special Requirements Related to Key Compromise

In the event of the compromised or suspected compromise, of the CA signing key, the CA shall notify all Subjects to whom it has issued certificates, the PMA and potentially Relying Parties.

7.10 Certificate Status Services

7.10.1 Operational Characteristics

The status of certificates is available through the CRL published in the repository and web site at an URLs specified in the certificate distribution points extension of the certificate.

7.10.2 Service Availability

The repository shall be available twenty-four (24) hours per day, seven (7) days per week subject to the maximum period of unavailability as specified in the CPS.

7.10.3 Optional features

No stipulation.

7.10.4 End of Subscription

The reasons for end of subscription shall include:

- Certificate expiration without renewal.

- Certificate revocation without replacing the certificate.

- The Subscriber contract termination

- The CA service termination.

7.11 Key Escrow and Recovery

The CA shall not hold in escrow Subject private keys.

7.11.1 Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices

Not applicable.

7.11.2 Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices

Not applicable.

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8 Facility, Management and Operational Controls

8.1 Physical Controls

Physical security controls shall be implemented that protect the CA and RA hardware and software from unauthorized use.

8.1.1 Site Location and Construction

The PKI system operations shall be conducted within a physically protected environment that deters, prevents, and detects unauthorized use of, access to, or disclosure of sensitive information and systems.

8.1.2 Physical Access

Physical access shall be auditable and restricted by implementing mechanisms to control access from one area of the facility to another or access into high-security zones.

Physical access shall be granted to the personnel in charge of the PKI or authorized persons.

8.1.3 Power and Air Conditioning

The power and air conditioning facilities shall be sufficient to support the operation of the PKI system.

8.1.4 Water Exposures

The PKI system shall be protected from water exposures.

8.1.5 Fire Prevention and Protection

The PKI system shall be protected with a fire suppression system.

8.1.6 Media Storage

Media shall be stored securely. Media used by the PKI system shall be protected from environmental threats such as temperature, humidity and magnetism.

8.1.7 Waste Disposal

All media used for the storage of information such as keys, activation data or PKI system files shall be sanitised or destroyed before released for disposal.

8.1.8 Off-Site Backup

If approved, Facilities used for off-site back-up shall have the same level of security as the primary PKI system site.

8.2   Procedural Controls

8.2.1   Trusted Roles

A trusted role is one whose incumbent performs functions that can introduce security problems if not carried out properly, whether accidentally or maliciously. The people selected to fill these roles must be diligent and trustworthy as described in the next section. The functions performed in these roles form the basis of trust in the entire PKI. Two approaches are taken to increase the likelihood that these roles can be successfully carried out. The first approach is to ensure that the person filling the role is trustworthy and properly trained. The second is to distribute the functions of the role among several people, so that any malicious activity requires collusion.

Trusted roles shall include, but shall not be limited to :

- PMA : PMA members oversee the creation and update of Certificate Policies, review Certification Practice Statements, review the results of CA audits for policy compliance, evaluate non-domain policies for acceptance within the domain, and generally oversee and manage the PKI certificate policies.

- Server Officer : this person is in charge of all tasks relating to the administration of the operating system.

- Network Officer : this person is in charge of all tasks relating to the administration of the network.

- Compliance Officer : this person is in charge of the security audit log and other archive data, the verification of network and server side security installation. He manages physical access to the PKI system.

- PKI Operator : this person is in charge of the management of the CA (CA Operator) or RA (RA Operator) functions such as cryptographic functions.

- LRA Operator : this person ensure the identification and authentication of prospective Subscribers and Subjects. LRA Operator functions may be performed by one or several individual.

Other trusted roles and their duties may be specified in the CPS.

8.2.2   Number of Persons Required per Task

Whenever possible a separate individual shall be identified for each trusted role.

All tasks relating to the CA and RA private key or certificate, such as key generation or key recovery, shall require the presence of the PMA or part of the PMA.

Sensitive CA tasks shall require dual operator control.

The number or persons required per task shall be specified in the CPS.

8.2.3 Identification and Authentication for Each Role

All PKI personnel shall have their identity and authorization verified before they are :

- Included in the access list for the PKI site.

- Included in the access list for physical access to the PKI system security zone required.

- Given credentials for the performance of their trusted role.

- Given an account on the PKI system.

8.2.4 Roles Requiring Separation of Duties

Roles requiring separation of duties shall be specified in the CPS.

8.3 Personnel Controls

8.3.1 Qualifications, Experience and Clearance Requirements

The CA shall ensure that all personnel performing duties with respect to the operation of the PKI system shall :

- Be appointing in writing (trusted roles shall be clearly defined in job files).

- Be long term employees.

- Be bound by contract or statute to the terms and conditions of the position they are to fill.

- Have received comprehensive training with respect to the duties they are to perform.

- Be bound by statute or contract not to disclose sensitive PKI system security-relevant information or Subscriber or Subject information.

- Not be assigned duties that may cause a conflict of interest with their PKI system duties.

8.3.2 Background Check Procedures

All background checks shall be performed in accordance with MCDR internal procedures and MCDR-HR Charter.

8.3.3 Training Requirements

The CA shall ensure that the personnel performing duties with respect to the operation of a component of the PKI system shall receive comprehensive training in :

- General security.

- Processes and procedures relevant to their trusted role.

As mentioned in MCDR- Training plan

8.3.4 Retraining Frequency and Requirements

The requirements of training described in Section 0 shall be kept current to accommodate changes in the PKI system. Refresher training must be conducted as required.

8.3.5 Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence

No stipulation.

8.3.6 Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions

In the event of actual or suspected unauthorized action by a person performing duties with respect to the operation of a component of the PKI system, the CA may suspend his or her access to the PKI system and take disciplinary actions.

8.3.7 Independent Contractor Requirements

Not applicable.

8.3.8 Documentation Supplied to Personnel

The CA must make available to its PKI system personnel the following documentation:

- This Policy and the full CPS.

- Other documentation needed to the personnel to perform their duties.

8.4   Audit Logging Procedures

8.4.1 Types of Events Recorded

The CA should record in audit log files all events relating to the security of the CA system.

At a minimum, the following type of events shall be recorded:

- All events relating to the security of the systems.

- System start-up and shutdown.

- Application start-up and shutdown.

- Attempts to create, remove, set passwords or change the system privileges of the users (operators, security, officers …).

- Generation of keys for PKI components

- Creation and revocation of certificates.

- Changes to PKI component details.

- Attempts to initialize, remove, Subjects.

- Write operations on the CRL.

- Call Center Logs.

All logs, whether electronic or manual, shall contain the date and time of the event, and the identity of the entity that caused the event.

The CA shall also collect and consolidate, either electronically or manually, security information not PKI-system generated, such as :

- Physical access logs.

- System configuration changes and maintenance.

- Personnel changes.

- Records of the destruction of media containing key material, activation data or personal Subscriber or Subject information.

8.4.2 Frequency of Processing Log

Audit logs shall be reviewed at least once (1) per week and all significant events shall be explained in an audit log summary. Such reviews involve verifying that the log has not been tampered with, and then briefly inspecting all log entries, with a more thorough investigation of any alerts or irregularities in the logs. Manual logs shall be recorded the day the event has occurred.

8.4.3 Retention Period of Audit Log

Audit logs shall be retained onsite for at least on (1) month after processing thereafter archived in accordance with Section 8.5.2.

8.4.4 Protection of Audit Log

The electronic audit log system must include mechanisms to protect the log files from unauthorized viewing, modification, and deletion.

Manual audit information must be protected from unauthorized viewing, modification and destruction.

8.4.5 Audit Log Backup Procedures

Audit logs and audit summaries must be backed up or copied if on paper form at least once (1) per week.

Audit log backup shall be protected with the same level of protection of audit log as described in Section 8.4.4.

8.4.6 Audit Collection system (Internal or External)

Security audit processes shall be invoked at system startup, and cease only at system shutdown.

8.4.7 Notification to Event-Causing Subject

Where an event is logged by the audit collection system no notice need to be given to the individual, organization, device or application which caused the event.

8.4.8 Vulnerability Assessments

The PKI system and operating personnel shall be watchful for attempts to violate the integrity of the PKI system, including the equipment, physical location, and personnel. The security audit data shall be reviewed for events such as repeated failed actions, requests for privileged information, attempted access of system files, and unauthenticated responses. The continuity of the security audit data shall be checked. A document shall summary the results of the period review of the audit logs.

8.5   Records Archival

8.5.1   Types of Records Archived

At a minimum, the following types of record shall be archived:

- PKI system equipment configuration files.

- The CP.

- The CPS.

- Any contractual Agreements to which the CA is bound (Subscriber, Subject, Relying Parties Agreements).

- Audit logs.

- All certificates and CRL as issued or published.

- Subject and Subscriber identification and authentication information.

- Certificate lifecycle information (certificate, revocation and re-key application information)

8.5.2   Retention Period for Archive

Archive records shall be kept for a period of 5 years of retention for legal documents, 15 years for the customers information for the private sector and 30 years for the governmental sectors.

8.5.3   Protection of Archive

An entity maintaining an archive of records shall protect the archive so that only the entity's authorized persons are able to obtain access to the archive. The archive is protected against unauthorized viewing, modification, deletion, or other tampering by storage within a trustworthy system. The media holding the archive data and the applications required to process the archive data shall be maintained to ensure that the archive data can be accessed for the time period set forth in this Policy.

8.5.4   Archive Backup Procedures

Archives shall be backed up and stored at the main site, and the integrity of backups shall be verifiable.

8.5.5   Requirements for Time-Stamping of Records

Certificates, CRLs, and other revocation database entries shall contain time and date information.

8.5.6 Archive Collection System (Internal or External)

Archive collection system shall be specified in the CPS.

8.5.7 Procedure to Obtain and Verify Archive Information

Only authorized trusted personnel are able to obtain access to the archive. The integrity of the information shall be verified when it is restored.

8.6 Key Changeover

The CA shall not issue certificates that extend beyond the expiration date of its own certificate and public key and CA's certificate validity period shall cover Subject certificate validity period past the last use of its private key.

The CA certificate may be renewed if ITIDA Root CA reconfirms the identity of the CA. Following such reconfirmation, ITIDA Root CA shall either approve or reject the renewal application.

Following an approval of a renewal request, the CA shall conduct a key generation ceremony in order to generate a new key pair for the CA. The CA shall issue a certificate request that shall be sent to the ITIDA Root CA. The ITIDA Root CA shall sign and issue the CA a new certificate and send it to the CA. The new CA key shall be used to issue new certificate. The old CA key shall continue to be available for CRL signing until all certificates issued under this key have expired.

New CA certificate containing the new CA public key generated during such key generation ceremony shall be made available to Relying Parties.

All Subject certificates shall have a lifetime up to three ((3)) years,.

8.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery

8.7.1 Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures

If a hacking attempt or other form of potential compromise of a CA becomes known, it shall be investigated in order to determine the nature and the degree of damage. If the CA key is suspected of compromise, the procedures outlined in Section 8.7.3 shall be followed. Otherwise the scope of potential damage shall be assessed in order to determine if the CA needs to be rebuilt, only some certificates need to be revoked, and/or the CA key needs to be declared compromised.

8.7.2 Computing Resources, Software and/or Data Are Corrupted

The CA shall maintain backup copies of system, databases, and private keys in order to rebuild the PKI system capability in case of software and/or data corruption.

8.7.3 Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures

In case of a CA key compromise, the CA shall immediately notify :

- The PMA.

- All PKI components.

- All Subjects.

- All Relying Parties if possible.

The CA shall also :

- Request the ITIDA Root CA to revoke its certificate and publish a new CRL.

- Revoke all issued certificates and issue a new CRL.

After addressing the factors that led to revocation, the CA shall :

- Generate a new CA signing key pair through a key generation ceremony and request the ITIDA Root CA to issue a new certificate for this new public key.

- Make available the new CA certificate containing the new CA public key generated during key generation ceremony

- Issue a new CRL and ensure the new CRL is signed using the new key pair.

The CA may re-issue certificates to all Entities.

8.7.4 Business Continuity Capabilities After a Disaster

The CA shall establish a disaster recovery plan for business continuity that outline the steps to be taken in the event of a natural or other type of disaster such as the corruption or loss of computing resources, software and/or data.

The repository service shall be restored within four ((4)) hours and standard certificate issuing services shall be restored within ((24))hours.

8.8 CA or RA Termination

In the event of termination of CA services:

- The PMA shall notify all contracted parties in writing, according to the contractual conditions.

- The PMA shall notify the ITIDA Root CA.

- The PMA shall notify Subjects that their certificates shall be revoked.

- The CA shall revoke all valid issued certificates and issue a new CRL.

- The ITIDA Root CA shall revoke the CA certificate and issue a new CRL.

- The CA signing key pair or the cryptographic module that holds the keys shall be destroyed.

- The archives shall be retained by the PMA in the manner and for the time described in Section 8.5.

In the event of change in management of the CA's operations, the PMA shall notify all other PKI components, all contracted parties and the ITIDA Root CA.

The notification of termination of CA services shall be communicated three (3) months prior the cease of CA services.

9 Technical Security Controls

9.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation

9.1.1 Key Pair Generation

All CA keys shall be generated by the CA and stored in a trusted hardware cryptographic module that meets at least FIPS PUB 140-2 level 3 requirements and requires multiple secret-shareholders.

The CA private key shall be only used for signing certificates and CRL.

CA keys are generated in a key generation ceremony.

RA keys shall be generated by the CA or RA and stored in a cryptographic container.

Subject keys shall be generated by a trusted hardware cryptographic module and stored in that module that meets at least security evaluation ITSEC E4 or FIPS PUB 140-2 level 2 requirements.

9.1.2 Private Key Delivery to CA component

Private key shall be delivered to CA component in a face-to-face process with the CA/RA. The component shall be identified and authenticated before delivery.

9.1.3 Private Key Delivery to Subject

Private key shall be delivered to Subject in a face-to-face process with the RA/LRA. The Subject shall be identified and authenticated before delivery.

9.1.4 Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

When a public key is transferred to the issuing CA to be certified, it shall be delivered through a mechanism ensuring that the public key has not been altered during transit and that the Subject possesses the private key corresponding to the transferred public key. An acceptable mechanism for public key delivery is a PKCS#10 certificate request package or an equivalent method.

9.1.5 CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties

The CA public key shall be delivered to Relying Party using an X.509 certificate. An acceptable mechanism for public key delivery is a PKCS#7 file with or without the complete certificate path.

The CA public key may be delivered directly on Subject tokens or may be download from a repository (website or directory).

9.1.6   Key Sizes

The CA shall use a 4096 bits RSA key pair.

Subjects shall use a 2048 bits RSA key pair.

9.1.7   Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking

Public key parameters shall always be generated and checked in accordance with the standard that defines the crypto algorithm in which the parameters are to be used.

The key pairs of the CA have been created using at least FIPS PUB 140-2 level 3 certified cryptographic modules.

The key pairs of the Subjects have been created using at least ITSEC E4 or FIPS PUB 140-2 level 2 cryptographic modules.

9.1.8   Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 V3 Key Usage Field)

The signing keys of the CA are the only keys permitted for signing certificates and CRLs and have key Cert Sign and CRL Sign key usage bits set.

Subject keys may be used for authentication, non-repudiation and digital signature and have Digital Signature and Non-Repudiation key usage bits set.

9.2   Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

9.2.1   Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls

The cryptographic module used for CA and RA meets at least FIPS PUB 140-2 level 3 requirements.

The cryptographic module used for Subjects meets at least ITSEC E4 or FIPS PUB 140-2 level 2 and may be a smartcard or an USB token.

All cryptographic modules shall be operated such that the private keys shall never be output in plain text.

Cryptographic modules shall check the quality of key pairs they generate.

9.2.2   Private Key Multi-Person Control

There shall be multiple person control for CA key generation operations. The PMA shall be present. Data used for key generation shall be shared by three (3) secret holders.

The CA keys may only be recovered under three (3) person control shareholders.

9.2.3 Private Key Escrow

No private keys shall be hold in escrow.

9.2.4 Private Key Backup

Private keys of the CA shall be backed up in an encrypted form that requires the use of three (3) key shares. This backup shall be stored securely (e.g. in a safe) in accordance with Section 8.1.6 and 8.1.8.

9.2.5 Private Key Archival

See Section 9.2.4.

9.2.6 Private Key Transfer into or Form a Cryptographic Module

The CA private keys shall be transferred into a cryptographic module for the following reasons :

- Test of the disaster recovery plan.

- Change of the cryptographic module.

- Change of the CA software.

In the event that a private key shall be transported from one cryptographic module to another, the private key shall be encrypted during transport and require the use of three (3) key shares.. Private keys shall never exist in plaintext from outside the cryptographic module boundary.

9.2.7 Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module

The CA private keys stored in the cryptographic module shall be protected from unauthorized access and use in accordance with the FIPS PUB 140-2 level 3 requirements applicable for the module.

The Subject private keys stored in the cryptographic module shall be protected from unauthorized access and use in accordance with the ITSEC E4 or FIPS PUB 140-2 level 2 requirements applicable for the module.

9.2.8 Method of Activating Private Key

CA private key shall be activated in accordance with the internal processes of the cryptographic module on which keys are generated.

PIN shall be used to activate the Subject private key.

9.2.9 Method of Deactivating Private Key

CA private key shall be deactivated when the cryptographic module power is cut or when key is erased from the cryptographic module.

Subject private key shall be deactivated after a pre-set period of inactivity or when the smartcard is removed from the smartcard reader or when the token is removed from the computer.

9.2.10 Method of Destroying Private Key

On termination of use of the CA private key, all backup of the private key shall be destroyed. The private key inside the cryptographic module shall be removed.

On termination of CA services, the cryptographic module shall be re-initialized and backup of the private key and shares shall be destroyed.

Subject private key shall be destroyed when the key is erased from the smartcard or token or when the chip of the smartcard or the token is cut in two.

9.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating

Requirements for cryptographic modules are as stated above in Section 9.2.1.

9.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

9.3.1 Public Key Archival

Public keys are archived as part of the certificate archival.

9.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods

Key usage periods for keying material shall be as follow:

- The CA key pairs are valid 6 years.

- Subject key pairs are valid up to(3)years.

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9.4 Activation Data

9.4.1 Activation Data Generation and Installation

PIN shall be used to protect access to Subject private keys. These PIN are called activation data. Subject activation data shall use random numbers and/or characters and shall be provided to the Subject in a sealed envelope.

9.4.2 Activation Data Protection

Activation data for cryptographic modules should be memorized, not written down. If written down, it shall be stored securely (e.g. in a safe) in accordance with Section 8.1.6.

9.4.3 Other Aspects of Activation Data

PIN shall be at minimum eight (8) digits and/or characters. PIN can be modified at any time.

9.5 Computer Security Controls

9.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements

PKI system equipment shall use operating systems that require authenticated logins, provide discretionary access control and a security audit control.

No stipulation for Subject computer.

9.5.2 Computer Security Rating

No stipulation.

9.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls

9.6.1 System Development Controls

The PKI system shall use software that has been designed and developed by a formal methodology.

9.6.2 Security Management Controls

The configuration of the PKI system as well as any modifications and upgrades shall be documented and controlled. There shall be a method of detecting unauthorized modification to the PKI software or configuration.

The CA shall notice to PMA about significant changes.

9.6.3 Life Cycle Security Controls

No stipulation.

9.7   Network Security Controls

The CA and RA server shall be protected from attack through any open or general purpose network with which it is connected. Such protection must be provided through the installation of a device configured to allow only the protocols and commands required for the operation of the CA and RA.

10 Certificate, CRL and OCSP Profiles

10.1 Certificate Profile

Field		Content		Critical
Version		"2" (for X.509 version 3)		√
serialNumber		Unique value within the CA		√
Signature		Algorithm used to sign the certificate		√
		algorithm	Sha2WithRSAEncryption	
Issuer		CA's DN		√
validity		Activation and expiry date for certificate		√
		notBefore	Activation date (UTCTime)	
		notAfter	Expiry date (UTCTime)	
Subject		Subject's DN		√
subjectPublicKeyInfo		Subject's public key		√
		algorithm	RSAEncryption	
		subjectPublicKey	Subject's public key	
Extension	AuthorityKeyIdentifier	Key identifier of the issuing CA's public key		√
		keyIdentifier	Derived from 160-bit SHA-2 of the issuing CA's public key	
	SubjectKeyIdentifier	Key identifier of the subject's public key		√
		keyIdentifier	Derived from 160-bit SHA-2 of the Subject's public key	
	KeyUsage	Authorized key usages		√

		digitalSignature "1"	
		nonRepudation "1"	
	CertificatePolicies	Certificate policies OID and URL	√
		policyIdentifier Certificate Policy OID CPSuri URL where CPS can be found userNotice Policy description including usage limits	
	BasicConstraints	End-entity certificate	no
		cA "FALSE" (End Entity) pathLenConstraint "0" (None)	
	extKeyUsage	Extended authorized key usages	no
		email protection, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4, client 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2, authentication, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3 code signing	
	CRLDistributionPoints	URL to CRL distribution point (HTTP)	no
		distributionPoint URL to CRL	
	QcStatement	Qualified certificate	no
		QcStatement "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.11.2" QcCompliance "0.4.0.1862.1.1" QcLimitValue "0.4.0.1862.1.2" and limit value and Egyptian currency	
signatureAlgorithm		Sha2 With RSA Encryption	√
signatureValue			no

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10.1.1 Version Number(s)

Certificates shall be X.509 Version 3 certificates, in accordance with the RFC3280 PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile.

Relying Party software shall support all the base (non-extension) X.509 fields :

Version	Version of X.509 certificate, version 3
serial Number	Unique serial number for certificate
Signature	CA signature to authenticate certificate
Issuer	DN of CA
Validity	Activation and expiry date for certificate
Subject	Subject's Distinguished Name
Subject Public Key identifier	Composed of 160-bit SHA-1

As well as the certificate extensions defined in Section 10.1.2.

10.1.2 Certificate Extensions

Certificate extensions used are :

Authority Key Identifier	Contains the key identifier of the issuing CA's public key (SHA2)
Subject Key Identifier	Contains the key identifier of the Subject's public key (SHA2)
Key Usage	Authorized key usages
Certificate Policies	Certificate policies OID and URL
Subject Alt Name	Subject's e-mail address
Basic Constraints	Specify the certificate is an end-entity certificate
Extended Key Usage	Extended authorized key usages
CRL Distribution Point	URL to CRL distribution point (HTTP)

The KeyUsage field shall be set as critical. Other fields shall be set as non-critical.

10.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers

The following OID algorithm is used:

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SHA2 With RSA Encryption   SHA-2   1.2.84.113549.1.1.11

10.1.4 Name Forms

Every Distinguished Name (DN) shall be in the form of an X.501 printable String.

10.1.5 Name Constraints

Subject and Issuer DNs shall comply with RFC 3739 and RFC 3280 standards and be present in all certificates.

10.1.6 Certificate Policy Object Identifier

The CA shall ensure that the Policy OID is contained within the certificates it issues.

The OID for MCDR General Signature Certificates policy identifier (1.3.6.1.4.1.33399.1.2)

10.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints Extension

No stipulation.

10.1.8 Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics

Certificates shall include the policyQualifier extension with the URL of its CPS and the userNotice extension.

10.1.9 Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies Extension

Critical extensions shall be interpreted as defined in RFC 3280.

10.2 CRL Profile

Field		Content	Critical
Version		"1" (for X.509 version 2 CRL)	
Signature		Algorithm used to sign the CRL algorithm Sha2WithRSAEncryption	
Issuer		CA's DN	
thisUpdate		Issue date and time of the CRL (UTCTime)	
nextUpdate		Date and time by which the next CRL will be issued (UTCTime) = thisUpdate + forty-eight (48) hours	

revokedCertificate		Listing of revoked certificates
		
		userCertificate revoked certificate serial number
		revocationDate
		    revocation date
		reasonCode
		    revocation reason	

Extension	AuthorityKeyIdentifier	Key identifier of the issuing CA's public key keyIdentifier Derived from 160-bit SHA-1 of the issuing CA's public key	
	cRLNumber	Unique value	
signatureAlgorithm		sha1WithRSAEncryption	
signatureValue			

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10.2.1 Version Number(s)

CRL shall be X.509 Version 2 CRL, in accordance with the RFC3280 PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile.

10.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions

All Relying Party software shall correctly process all CRL extensions identified in the RFC 3280 PKIX Certificate and CRL profile.

CRL extensions used are :

AuthorityKeyIdentifier	Contains the key identifier of the issuing CA's public key (SHA1)
CRLNumber	Contains a number incremented by the CA each time the CRL is modified
reasonCode	Revocation reason code

10.3 OCSP Profile

10.3.1 Version Number(s)

OCSP Responder Version 6.2.3 and it support OCSP version 5.x or later, in accordance with the RFC3280 PKIX Certificate.

10.3.2 OCSP Extensions

AuthorityKeyIdentifier	Contains the key identifier of the issuing CA's public key (SHA1)
reasonCode	Revocation reason code

11 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

11.1 Frequency and Circumstances of Assessment

A compliance audit shall be completed prior to begin PKI service to demonstrate compliance with the process and procedural requirements of this Policy and the ITIDA requirements. Annual internal audits shall be conducted on the same basis.

The PMA has the right to require an internal or external compliance audit of the PKI system at any time and shall do so immediately on discovering any breach of security or processes, or suspicion of such a breach.

11.2 Identify/Qualifications of Assessor

The assessor shall demonstrate competence in the field of audit compliance PKI and cryptographic technologies.

11.3 Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity

For external audit, the compliance assessor shall be independent and have no connections with the audited parties. Such assessor shall not have a conflict of interest that hinders their ability to perform auditing services.

11.4 Topics Covered by Assessment

The purpose of a compliance audit shall be to verify that the audited party has in place, a system to assure the quality of the services that it provides, and that it complies with all of the requirements of this CP and its CPS. All aspects of the audited party's operation related to this Policy shall be subject to compliance audit inspections.

11.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency

When the compliance auditor finds a discrepancy between the PKI's operation and the stipulations of its CPS, the auditor shall note the discrepancy and notify the parties identified in Section 11.6 of the discrepancy. Then, the audited party or the auditor will propose a remedy.

Any decision regarding which actions shall be taken shall be based on the severity of the discrepancy.

11.6 Communications of Results

The compliance auditor shall report the results of a compliance audit to the PMA. The PMA is responsible for reporting the results of the compliance audit to the PKI operators. The implementation of remedies shall be communicated to the PMA.

12 Other Business and Legal Matters

12.1 Fees

12.1.1 Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees

The CA is entitled to charge Subscribers and/or Subjects for the issuance, management and renewal of certificates.

Communication of fees is done through Subscriber Agreement and/or Subject Agreement.

12.1.2 Certificate Access Fees

MCDR shall not charge any certificate access fees on Subscribers, Subjects and Relying Parties.

12.1.3 Revocation or Status Information Access Fees

MCDR shall not charge any fees for accessing the CRL.

12.1.4 Fees for Other Services

MCDR shall not charge any fees for access to this CP or other related information.

12.1.5 Refund Policy

The CA may at its discretion provide a full or partial refund of certificate fees in the event it is unable to meets his obligation as described in the CP.

12.2 Financial Responsibility

12.2.1 Insurance Coverage

No stipulation.

12.2.2 Other Assets

MCDR shall have sufficient financial resources to maintain their operations and perform their duties.

12.2.3 Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-entities

MCDR provides warranty for manufacturing deficits based on vendors agreements

12.3 .Confidentiality of Business Information

12.3.1 Scope of Confidential Information

All information provided by Subscribers and Subjects shall be kept confidential and private except that which are bound into the certificate.

The following information is also considered confidential:

- Private keys of PKI components and Subjects.

- Activation data of PKI components and Subjects.

- PKI components' audit logs.

No one shall have access to a private key or activation data but the owner.

12.3.2 Information Not Within the Scope of Confidential Information

Information which are not considered confidential are :

- Certificates.

- CRL.

12.3.3 Responsibility to Protect Confidentiality Information

All reasonable effort shall be made to protect confidential information from compromise or disclosure.

12.4 Privacy of Personal Information

12.4.1 Privacy Plan

All Subscribers and Subjects information is considered to be sensitive and confidential and is protected at the appropriate level. Under no circumstance is personal information to be released, unless there is a case concerning misuse.

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12.4.2 Information Treated as Private

All information about Subscribers and Subjects that it is not publicly available through the content of the issued certificate or CRL is treated as private.

12.4.3 Information Not Deemed Private

All information made public in a certificate is deemed not private.

12.4.4 Responsibility to Protect Private Information

All reasonable effort shall be made to protect private information from compromise and disclosure to third parties.

12.4.5 Notice and Consent to Use Private Information

Private information shall not be used without the consent of the party to whom that information applies.

12.4.6 Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process

Confidential/private information shall be disclosed in response to judicial, administrative or other legal process.

12.4.7 Other Information Disclosure Circumstances

No stipulation.

12.5 Intellectual Property Rights

MCDR shall retain ownership and intellectual property rights for this CP, the CPS, and any public key certificates and private keys that it issues.

12.6 Representations and Warranties

12.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties

The CA shall conform to the stipulations of this Policy, including the following obligations :

- Comply with this CP and its applicable CPS.

- Protect the integrity and confidentiality of its private keys.

- Use its public and private keys only for the purpose for which they were issued and with the authorized mechanisms, that is to say signature of certificates and CRL.

- Accept the compliance audit results and consequences and take actions to solve discrepancies underlying in the compliance audit report.

- Comply with agreements or contracts with PKI components, Subscribers, Subjects or Relying Parties.

- Provide documentation for internal management procedures.

- Provide infrastructure and certification services, including personnel for the secure and quality operation of public certificate services.

- Provide in an online repository its certificate and the ITIDA Root CA certificate.

- Provide in an online repository this CP, Subscriber Agreements, Subject agreements and Relying Party Agreements.

- Publish in an online repository the issued CRL.

- Ensure that information included in a certificate has been verified, in accordance with this CP, whenever a certificate is issued.

- Upon receipt of a certificate request or revocation request, verify the RA/LRA issuing the request is an authorized RA/LRA.

- Provide prompt notice in case of compromise of its own private keys.

- Store and manage its private keys through a hardware cryptographic module.

- Archive securely its private keys.

Subscriber and Subject Agreements may include additional representations and warranties.

12.6.2 RA/LRA Representations and Warranties

RA shall conform to the stipulations of this Policy, including the following obligations :

- Protect the integrity and confidentiality of its private keys.

- Use its public and private keys only for the purpose for which they were issued and with the authorized mechanisms, that is to say authentication with PKI component and certificate and revocation requests signature.

RA/LRA shall conform to the stipulations of this Policy, including the following obligations :

- Comply with this CP and its applicable CPS.

- Accept the compliance audit results and consequences and take actions to solve discrepancies underlying in the compliance audit report.

- Comply with agreements or contracts with PKI components, Subscribers, Subjects or Relying Parties.

- Provide documentation for internal management procedures.

- Provide infrastructure and certification services, including personnel for the secure and quality operation of public certificate services.

- Receive, verify and relay certification requests and revocation requests.

- Protect the integrity and confidentiality of all personal and identifying information collected during registration processes.

- Verify the authenticity of identifying information provided by Subscribers and Subjects.

- Generate Subject private keys in a hardware cryptographic module such as smartcards, which should be protected by a PIN code.

- Provide Subject activation data and public/private keys to Subject securely and confidentially.

Subscriber and Subject Agreements may include additional representations and warranties.

12.6.3 Subject Representations and Warranties

Subjects shall conform to the stipulations of this Policy, including the following obligations :

- Comply with this CP and its applicable CPS.

- Protect the integrity and confidentiality of its private keys and activation data.

- Use its public and private keys only for the purpose for which they were issued and with the authorized mechanisms.

- Accept the compliance audit results and consequences.

- Notify the RA/LRA in case of compromise of its own private keys.

- Ensure the accuracy of information provide to the RA/LRA in certificate or revocation requests.

- Notify the RA/LRA in case of change of information in the certificate.

Subject Agreements may include additional representations and warranties.

12.6.4 Subscriber Representations and Warranties

Subscriber shall conform to the stipulations of this Policy, including the following obligations:

- Comply with this CP and its applicable CPS.

- Ensure the accuracy of information provide to the RA/LRA.

- Notify the RA/LRA in case of the Subject is no more an employee of the organization for certificates issued within organization Subscriber.

Subscriber Agreements may include additional representations and warranties.

12.6.5 Relying Party Representations and Warranties

Relying parties shall conform to the stipulations of this Policy, including the following obligations :

- Use the certificate for the purpose for which it was issued, as indicated in key usage certificate information.

- Check each certificate for validity, using CRL, prior to reliance.

- Establish trust in the CA which issued a certificate by verifying the certificate path.

- Use the public key extracted from the certificate only for verifying a digital signature.

Relying Party Agreements may include additional representations and warranties.

12.6.6 Representations and Warranties of Other Participants

No stipulation.

12.7 Disclaimers of Warranties

Warranty Disclaimer shall be specified in the relevant Subscriber Agreements, Subject Agreements and Relying Party Agreements.

12.8 Limitations of Liability

Unless otherwise agreed in a Subscriber Agreement, Subject Agreement, Relying Customer Agreement or similar contract, and except as mandated by law, MCDR accepts no liability for consequential damages relating to a failure of the services provided under this CP, or for matters other than the correct identification of a Subject in a digital certificate.

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12.9 Indemnities

No stipulation.

12.10 Term and Termination

12.10.1   Term

This CP shall remain in effect until either a new CP is approved by the PMA and published in the repository or the PKI is terminated.

12.10.2   Termination

This CP shall survive any termination of the CA. The requirements of this CP shall remain in effect through the end of the archive period.

12.10.3   Effect of Termination and Survival

The responsibilities for protecting confidential and private information and MCDR's intellectual property rights shall survive the termination of this CP.

12.11 Individual Notices and Communications with Participants

If not specified by agreements between the parties, participants shall use adequate methods to communicate with each other in accordance with criticality and subject matter of the communication.

12.12 Amendments

12.12.1   Procedure for Amendment

Errors, updates or suggested changes to this CP shall be communicated to the contact in Section 4.4.2. Such communication shall include a description of the change, a change justification and contact information for the person requesting the change.

When the PMA review this CP, the reviewed CP shall be published on a web site and sent to the CA. The CA shall notify its PKI components, Subscribers and Subjects.

12.12.2   Notification Mechanism and Period

The PMA reserve the right to amend this CP without notification for amendments that are not material, including without limitation corrections of typographical errors, changes to URLs, and change to contact information. The PMA shall designate whether amendments are material or non-material.

The PMA shall notify the CA of material amendments to this CP proposed by the PMA. The notification shall contain a statement of proposed changes, the comment period and the proposed effective date of change. The PMA may request the CA to notify its PKI components, Subscribers and Subjects.

Written and signed comments on proposed changes shall be directed to the PMA. Decisions with respect to the proposed changes are at the sole discretion of the PMA

The PMA shall accept, accept with modification or reject the proposed change after completion of the review period. The PMA will determine the period for final change notice.

12.12.3   Circumstances Under Which OID Must be Changed

The PMA shall determine whether changes to the CP require a change in the CP OID.

12.13 Dispute Resolution Provisions

A dispute should be resolved by negotiation by the PMA if possible. A dispute not settled by negotiation should be resolved by Egyptian domestic courts.

12.14 Governing Law

The laws of Egypt shall govern this CP.

12.15 Compliance with Applicable Law

MCDR CA operates under the requirements of Egyptian Law Number 15 of 2004, Regulating Electronic Signatures and the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology Decree Number 101 for 2010, Executive Regulations of the Digital Signature Law, regulated by the Information Technology Industry Development Authority (ITIDA).

12.16 Miscellaneous Provisions

12.16.1   Entire Agreement

No stipulation.

12.16.2   Assignment

No stipulation.

12.16.3   Severability

If a section of this CP is determined incorrect or invalid by a court of law or other tribunal having authority, the other sections of this CP shall remain valid until the policy is updated.

12.16.4   Enforcement (Attorney's Fees and Waiver of Rights)

No stipulation.

12.16.5   Force Majeure

No stipulation.

12.17 Other Provisions

No stipulation.

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